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PROTECTING THE LEGAL INTERESTS OF
CHILDREN WHEN SHOCKING,
RESTRAINING, AND SECLUDING ARE THE
MEANS TO AN EDUCATIONAL END
JUSTIN

J.

FARRELL"

INTRODUCTION

The quality of the education received by students with
disabilities has improved steadily over the past forty years. This
is no doubt the product of a growing body of research in cognitive
and educational psychology.
It is also the product of a
commitment by Congress to ensure that students with
disabilities have access to a free, appropriate public education.'
While the law has generally protected the interests and the
rights of students with disabilities, it does not adequately protect
the interests of students who receive aversive therapies in the
educational setting.
Students who are diagnosed with profound mental
retardation,2 autism, or emotional disturbances are potential
candidates for aversive therapy.3 Aversives include application
of painful stimuli, including slapping, pinching, and electric
shock; forced inhalation of painful or noxious sprays; food
I Managing Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2009, St. John's
University School of Law; M.A., 2002, New York University Steinhardt School of
Education; Mus. B., 1998, State University of New York College at Fredonia.
1 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
2 Children diagnosed with profound mental retardation have an IQ of below 20
or 25, along with deficiencies in adaptive behavior; for example, communication
skills, interpersonal skills, or awareness of health and safety. AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR
42-46 (4th ed., text rev. 2000).
See Patricia A. Amos, New Considerations in the Prevention of Aversives,
Restraint, and Seclusion: Incorporatingthe Role of Relationships into an Ecological
Perspective, 29 RES. & PRAC. FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE DISABILITIES 263, 265

(2004).
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deprivation; physical restraint by mechanical device or
otherwise; and confinement in a "time-out room."4 It is perhaps
unsurprising that these methods have generated significant
controversy in the special education community. Opponents of
the use of aversive treatments argue that the use of aversives
and restraints produces dehumanizing outcomes and leads to
segregation of students from their peers and their communities.'
Many educators and scholars feel that these techniques are akin
to child abuse6 and point to cases involving injuries and death
suffered from the use of restraints.7 However controversial,
proponents of the use of aversives-and often the parents of the
children receiving the therapy--point to great success in
changing and eliminating a wide range of behaviors, which
results from their use.'
Particularly, the use of mild electric

4 See N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP'T, SUMMARY OF MAJOR REVISIONS TO THE
REGULATIONS ON BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS
1-2 (2006), available at
http://www.vesid.nysed.gov/specialed/behavioral/summaryll06.pdf; see also Amos,
supra note 3.
5 See APRAIS: The Alliance to Prevent Restraint, Aversive
Interventions and
Seclusion, http://aprais.tash.org (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
6 See Susan Jacob-Timm, Ethical and Legal Issues Associated with the Use of
Aversives in the Public Schools: The SIBIS Controversy, 25 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 184,
192 (1996).
7 See Joseph B. Ryan & Reece L. Peterson, Physical Restraint in School, 29
BEHAV. DISORDERS 154, 154 (2004). It is difficult to ascertain an exact figure for
restraint related deaths in the United States; however, eight to ten per year is a
conservative figure. See id; see also Coalition Against Institutionalized Child Abuse,
Deaths in Facilities, http://www.caica.orgRESTRAINTS%20Death%2OList.htm (last
visited Feb. 22, 2009) (compiling stories of people with developmental disabilities
who have been killed in incidents involving aversives and restraints); infra notes
48-52 and accompanying text.
8 See
Jennifer Sinco Kelleher, Judge Backs Shock Treatment, NEWSDAY
(Melville, N.Y.), Sept. 9, 2006, at A13; Parents Battle for Right To Shock Son with
Autism, AUGUSTA CHRON., Mar. 15, 2007, at A06; Editorial, To Shock or Not To
Shock, CI. TRIB., Mar. 19, 2007, at 16.
' See generally Judge Rotenberg Center: Letters from Parents of JRC Students,
http://www.judgerc.org (follow "Papers and Documents" tab on top of page; then
follow "Letters from Parents" hyperlink under "Comments from Parents") (last
visited Mar. 24, 2009). But see Thomas R. Linscheid, Are Aversive Procedures
Durable? A Five-Year Follow-Up of Three Individuals Treated with Contingent
Electrical Shock, 2 CHILD & ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH CARE 67, 75 (1993)
(noting that little research exists on the long-term effectiveness of the treatment).
The Judge Rotenberg Center is a residential facility that employs the use of
aversives and has been the source of scrutiny by both state agencies and by the
media. See Letter from James P. DeLorenzo, N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, to Matthew L.
Israel, Ph.D., (June 12, 2006) (detailing health and safety concerns at the Rotenberg
Center). See generally Jennifer Gonnerman, School of Shock: Eight States Are
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shock therapy has, in some cases, proven successful in
dramatically reducing the rate of life-threatening, self-injurious
behavior ("SIB").1" The use of these techniques has captured
even the general public's interest and is frequently the topic of
newspaper articles that question the necessity of the
treatments.
Disputes often occur between parents and school districts
regarding the necessity of aversive therapies. In some instances,
the school district refuses to, or, in accordance with state statute,
may not implement a system of aversives at the parent's
request.1 2 In other circumstances, parents seek redress from the
courts because of alleged civil rights violations stemming from
the use of aversives. 13
Sending Autistic, Mentally Retarded, and Emotionally Troubled Kids to a Facility
That Punishes Them with Painful Electric Shocks. How Many Times Do You Have
To Zap a Child Before It's Torture?, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 36
(detailing history of the Rotenberg School, providing personal accounts of aversive
treatments, and describing Dr. Israel as a "radical"); Jennifer Smith, Parents File
Suit vs. State over School for Disabled, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Nov. 6, 2006, at
A14 (reporting that a mother filed suit against New York State Department of
Education for allowing her child and others to be placed in the Rotenberg School).
W0Thomas R. Linscheid & Heidi Reichenbach, Multiple Factorsin the Long-Term
Effectiveness of Contingent Electric Shock Treatment for Self-Injurious Behavior: A
Case Example, 23 RES. DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 161, 161-62 (2002). SIB is a
disorder that causes a person to engage in repetitive behaviors that result in
physical harm. See Jacob-Timm, supra note 6, at 185. The term specifically excludes
"deliberate acts of self-harm observed among individuals with emotional disturbance
such as suicidal gestures." See id. at 188. In one case, a child's SIB was so extreme
that he "spent the majority of his time in physical restraint." See Linscheid &
Reichenbach, supra, at 163. The use of automated electric shock therapy reduced the
number of times the student hit his head from approximately one-hundred per
minute to nearly zero. See id. at 168-69.
11See, e.g., Parents Battle for Right To Shock Son with Autism, supra note 8;
Editorial, supra note 8.
12 E.g., Phelan v. Bell, 8 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that school district
refused to allow student to wear a device that would deliver electric shock to inhibit
child's SIB); Maniscalco ex rel. Rebelo v. Salinas Union High Sch. Dist., No. C-9520314-JW, 1996 WL 266153, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 1996) (noting that school
district failed to allow plaintiff the use of a SIBIS device as part of plaintiffs
educational program). In some states, the use of aversive therapies is prohibited by
statute. See infra note 143.
13 See, e.g., Joseph M. ex rel. B.M. v. Ne. Educ. Intermediate Unit 19, 516 F.
Supp. 2d 424, 431, 435, 441 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (parents brought suit claiming, among
other things, that their minor son's rights had been violated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
when teacher's assistant employed various aversive techniques); M.H. v. Bristol Bd.
of Educ., No. 3:98-CV-867 AVC, 2002 WL 33802431, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 9, 2002)
(parents brought suit on behalf of child claiming that child's due process rights and
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had been violated when he was restrained to a chair
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What is clear from the controversies that arrive in the court
system is that essential rights of the child are at stake-notably,
the child's right to a free and appropriate public education. 4
What is overlooked, however, is the possibility that the child's
and his parent's rights can become so distinct that they become
separate from and perhaps hostile to each other. Both the
parents of the child and the school districts weigh in-often in
conflict-about what the most appropriate education plan is for
the child. However, the current procedural framework does not
adequately consider the child's interests. This is especially
troublesome given the surprising prospect that many parents
later report that they felt manipulated and coerced into allowing
their children to receive aversive therapy.1 5
The law governing the use of aversives in the educational
16
setting is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA"), which mandates that all children classified with
disabilities have access to a free, appropriate public education.1
The IDEA provides the process by which a student would receive
aversive therapies for educational purposes.
Within this
framework, however, a child could too easily be subject to
unnecessary aversives while another could be denied aversive
therapies that he or she truly needs. To that end, the IDEA
needs to be amended to deal more carefully with this particular
class of cases. The severity of the consequences of receiving or
being denied aversive therapy, coupled with the wide range of
emotions that parents experience while shaping their child's
future, compels the conclusion that the child should be afforded a
high degree of procedural safeguards.

while a teacher spat water on him); cf. In re Kauffman, 604 N.E.2d 1285, 1286
(Mass. 1992) (denying on procedural grounds request for habeas corpus relief for two
wards at the Rotenberg Center who claimed that they were being "'illegally and
unlawfully restrained of [their] liberty' ").
4 Controversies arrive in either state or federal court after a multi-layered
administrative process. See generally infra notes 71-113 and accompanying text
(detailing process).
15 See Amos, supra note 3.
16 See Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2000
& Supp. IV 2004). The Act was reauthorized in 2004 as the "Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act." See Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647, 2647. For
purposes of consistency with many legal and educational scholars, this Note will use
the IDEA nomenclature.
17 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A).
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Part I of this Note will explore the use of three of the most
severe aversive therapies in the educational setting and the
ongoing debate in the educational and psychological communities
about their effectiveness. Part II will introduce the legal issues
raised by the use of aversives and demonstrate instances in
which children have compelling, and often separate, superior
legal interests from their parents.
Part III suggests that
Congress amend the IDEA to ensure that when aversive
therapies are proposed for a child's education plan, there is
judicial supervision on that limited question, a guardian ad litem
is appointed for the child, and the court considers the necessity of
the therapies according to the "best interest of the child"
standard.
I

A.

THE USE AND THE PREVALENCE OF AVERSIVES IN
PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Restraint and Seclusion

"The therapeutic benefit to children of restraints and
seclusion remains one of the most contentious issues in
the literature.""i
The term restraint, as used in behavior
management, is one of any number of interventions which
"restrict[] freedom of movement or normal access to one's body." 9
The three common types of restraints employed with children are
physical, mechanical, and chemical.2 ° Physical restraints involve
one or more staff members exerting physical force upon the child
to restrict his or her movement.2 1 Mechanical restraints employ
devices such as body jackets and leather or cloth straps as means
to accomplish the same end.22 The term "chemical restraint" is

"I David M. Day, Examining the Therapeutic Utility of Restraints and Seclusion
with Children and Youth: The Role of Theory and Research in Practice, 72 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 266, 269 (2002).
19 Sheila S. Kennedy & Wanda K. Mohr, A Prolegomenon on Restraint of
Children: Implicating Constitutional Rights, 71 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 26, 27

(2001).
20

Day, supra note 18, at 266.

21

Id.

I Id. Other devices include cuffs and belts, papoose boards, five-point restraints
(to restrain a child to a bed), and devices to restrain a child in a chair. Id.
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used to describe the use of medications2 3to sedate children and is
not typically used in the school setting.
Proponents of the use of restraint argue that it is an
important tool in ensuring the safety of the student as well as of
the other children when he or she is exhibiting aggressive
behavior.2 4 Some studies indicate that the use of restraint
encourages children to develop coping skills and self-control.25
Still others suggest that its use encourages students to verbalize
their feelings because of the physical bond created between the
student and the caretaker.26
The use of a "time-out" as an aversive behavioral
management technique is employed by more than seventy
percent of teachers of students with behavioral or emotional
disorders.27 While the definition of a time-out may differ between
behavioral psychologists and educators, 28 the primary goalreducing inappropriate student behavior by removing them from
reinforcing environments-is consistent.29
Time-outs are typically categorized as exclusionary or nonexclusionary." Exclusionary time-outs involve the removal of the
student from the educational setting for a period of time when he

2' See Ryan & Peterson, supra note 7, at 155. As chemical restraint is not
typically used in the school setting, it is beyond the scope of this Note.
24 See Kennedy & Mohr, supra note 19.
25 Michael A. Nunno et al., Learning from Tragedy: A Survey of Child and
Adolescent Restraint Fatalities, 30 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1333, 1334 (reviewing
literature).
26 Id.; Day, supra note 18, at 271. Those who proffer this argument contend that
there are two phases of a restraint procedure. During the first phase-the resistance
phase-the child rejects the caretaker and struggles. During the second phase-the
resolution phase-the child, bonded with the caretaker by his or her physical contact
and "intense closeness," will be more willing to disclose his or her feelings. See id.
27 Janice A. Grskovic et al., Reducing Time-Out Assignments for Students with
Emotional/BehavioralDisorders in a Self-Contained Classroom, 13 J. BEHAv. EDUC.
25, 25 (2004). The statistic presented by the authors of this study does not indicate
the relative number of teachers that employ non-exclusionary time-outs versus
exclusionary time-outs. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
' See Joseph B. Ryan et al., Using Time-Out Effectively in the Classroom,
TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILD., Mar./Apr. 2007, at 60, 60. Behavioralists would
characterize a time-out as a denial of the student's access to a reinforcing
environment. Educators characterize the time-out interval as a period for calming
down or cooling off. Id.
2 See id.

11 Grskovic et al., supra note 27, at 26.
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or she exhibits a particular behavior. 31 A non-exclusionary timeout, on the other hand, involves the removal of a positive
reinforcement while the student remains in the educational
setting. 32
The student, therefore, continues to observe the
classroom instruction but may not participate in the classroom
activities.3
Seclusion is a specific type of exclusionary time-out which
involves the isolation of a student to a "room or space from which
he or she cannot escape." 34 The student remains in the time-out
room until a certain period of time has elapsed.
Some
proponents of the use of seclusion posit that it is generally
therapeutic and may teach children coping skills and selfcontrol.3 6 Other studies suggest that children are cognizant as to
why they are being secluded and may gain more control of their
own behavior.3 7
While advocates of both restraint and seclusion time-outs
announce therapeutic and safety benefits, many scholars are
sharply critical of the practice. Most qualitative research on the
subject espouses the need for more empirical studies.3 Studies of
the use of restraints on children with disabilities have been
conducted almost exclusively in residential hospital settings.3 9
While the use of physical and mechanical restraint has become
more prevalent in the educational setting,4" there are scant

31 See id. For example, a student who is showing aggressive behavior that is
causing a disturbance in the classroom might be removed from the room for a period
of time.
32 Id.
33 Ryan et al., supra note 28, at 61.
3' Amos, supra note 3. The author argues that seclusion is a form of restraint
especially in its frequent combination with chemical restraints. See id. Some
scholars do not consider seclusion a form of a time-out. See Day, supra note 18, at
271. Time-outs are not effective when they are perceived as a punishment by the
child and some psychologists have stated that the very theoretical basis for seclusion
is punishment. Id.
3' Ryan et al., supra note 28, at 62.
36 Day, supra note 18, at 267.
17 See id. at 272-73. However, peer review of these studies has led to widespread
criticism. See id. at 273.
1 See id. at 274 (suggesting that more research be completed to study the shortand long-term effects of seclusion and restraint); Kennedy & Mohr, supra note 19, at
28 (reviewing the literature).
31 See Ryan & Peterson, supra note 7, at 156.
40 Id.
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recent studies on the use of restraint in schools.4 1 This lack of
research has led many scholars to be even more cautious of
employing seclusion as a behavior intervention.
What little research has been conducted, skeptics argue, has
demonstrated that there is little or no therapeutic benefit derived
from restraint and seclusion.42 Some warn that practitioners
43
may become complacent with the procedures and overuse them.
Worse yet, some argue that caregivers will, and have, used
restraint and seclusion for such dubious purposes as convenience,
Other studies suggest that children
coercion, and retaliation.'
perceive the time-out rooms as a punitive measure,4 5 calling into
question their therapeutic benefit.4 6 Even so, scholars who are
generally opposed to the use of restraint and seclusion typically
concede the necessity of the procedures in severe cases where all
reasonable alternatives have been considered.4 7
Arguably the single most disturbing aspect of the use of
restraint and seclusion is the alarmingly high number of children
that are injured or killed while the techniques are being used.
Forty-five children died in restraints in residential facilities
between 1993 and 2003;4 1 seven of these children were also in
isolation.4 9 More than half of the fatalities were due to some
form of asphyxiation,5 0 and ten children suffered a cardiac
arrhythmia which led to cardiac arrest."1 In one such instance, a
twelve-year-old child asphyxiated and died during a manual
restraint procedure in a residential facility after he threatened to
run away.5 2

See id.
See Kennedy & Mohr, supra note 19, at 33. Some studies have shown that the
use of restraints runs directly contrary to modem psychological treatment for
children with a conduct disorder. See id. at 31.
43 See Day, supra note 18, at 267 (reviewing studies).
Kennedy & Mohr, supra note 19.
41 See Day, supra note 18, at 267 (reviewing studies).
46 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
47 Day, supra note 18, at 267.
48 Nunno et al., supra note 25, at 1335.
49 Id. at 1336, 1338.
50 Id. at 1337.
41
42

11Id. at 1336-37.

Coalition Against Institutionalized Child Abuse, Jason Tallman, http'//www.
caica.orgINEWS%2OTallman%2OMain%2OPage.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2009). The
child was restrained by two attendants, face down on a pillow. Id.
52
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Interestingly, though the controversy has led to many calls
for widespread policy reform in medical and residential health
care facilities, it has not led to similar cries in the education
community.5 3 Similarly, the strict guidelines for restraint seen
within areas such as the medical community and in law
enforcement are not found consistently in the educational
setting.5 4 The American Psychological Nurses Association, for
example, provides standards for appropriate methods of restraint
and seclusion, continuous monitoring of the patient, and a
debriefing with the patient following release. 5
B.

Electric Shock
The use of electric shock in an educational setting is
employed in only the most extreme cases. Electrical shock in this
setting is delivered over a brief period of time to an individual
area of the body. 6 Typically, the shock is delivered over a period
for approximately one second to a patch of skin on one of the
child's extremities.5 ' The use of this type of therapy is called for
in cases where the child displays inappropriate behaviors that
are self-injurious, 5 stereotypical,5 9 or aggressive. 6' Devices used
to treat self-injurious behavior 1 typically deliver a shock
automatically in response to a specific, targeted behavior.6
Systems designed to target aggressive behaviors deliver a similar
shock to a student upon the activation of the device by a teacher

" See Amos, supra note 3, at 266.

54 See Ryan & Peterson, supra note 7, at 155.
5'See AM. PSYCHIATRIC NURSES ASS'N, SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT STANDARDS
OF PRAC. 8-13 (rev. 2007), available at http://www.apna.org/files/public/APNA

SR Standards-Final.pdf. The guidelines also include standards for training and
reporting. See id. at 1-13.
56 Johnny L. Matson & Debra Farrar-Schnieder, Common BehaviorDecelerators
(Aversives) and Their Efficacy, 3 CHILD & ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH CARE 49,
50 (1991).
51Id. The severity of the shock has been likened to the sting of the snap of a
rubber band. Jacob-Timm, supra note 6, at 189.
5'Matson & Farrar-Schnieder, supra note 56.
19Id. Stereotypical behaviors in a severely disabled child may include behaviors
such as habitual rocking. Id.
60 Id.
61 Self-Injurious

Behavior Inhibiting
Reichenbach, supra note 10, at 162.
62 See, e.g., id.

Devices

("SIBIS").

Linscheid

&
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or a caregiver.63 In such cases, the student wears the device and
remote receiver in a backpack, and the teacher carries the
transmitter,which is stored in a small, secure box with a photo of
the student on the outside.64
Those who support the use of electrical shock as a
therapeutic aversive therapy often point to its effectiveness in
drastically reducing targeted behaviors in a short period of
time.6 5 Moreover, some positive secondary effects are often
reported such as increased socialization skills.66 Some academics
indicate that the therapy ends many students' dependence on
potentially injurious restraining techniques .6'
Researchers,
however, point out that few studies have been conducted
measuring the long-term effectiveness of the therapy.6" Still
others note the existence-albeit rare-of abuse, that is,
misusing the delivery of electric shock.6 9 Much of the controversy
that has garnered the public's attention, though, comes from the
anecdotal stories from former students and their families who
come forward to report their emotional experiences during
treatment. °

Nathan A. Blenkush, Robert E. von Heyn & Matthew L. Israel, The Effect of
Contingent Skin Shock on Treated and Untreated Problem Behaviors (2007)
(unpublished psychological study), http://www.judgerc.org/effectsofshock.html. The
device, a Graduated Electronic Decelerator ("GED") delivers a slightly stronger
shock than a typical SIBIS and lasts for two seconds. See id.
64 Id.
65 See, e.g., Matson & Farrar-Schnieder, supra note 56 (case study where a
student reduced self-injurious behavior to nearly zero in five days); see also supra
note 10 and accompanying text (stating that mild shock therapy dramatically
reduced the rate of life-threatening SIB in several psychology studies).
6 Jacob-Timm, supra note 6, at 189.
63

67 See id. at 187.

G See Linscheid, supra note 9.
69 Peter Gerhardt et al., Social Policy on the Use of Aversive Interventions:
Empirical, Ethical, and Legal Considerations, 3 J. AUTIsM & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISORDERS 265, 270 (1991).

See Gonnerman, supra note 9, at 36-38. In that article, a student reported
that he still had nightmares about the electrical shock therapy and often felt suicidal
during the treatment. Id.
71
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UNDERLYING LEGAL PRINCIPLES

The Administrative Process Under the IDEA

The IDEA enumerates several general categories of
disabilities,7 1 which would, depending on the individual student,
qualify him or her for special education services.7 The students
who most often receive aversive therapies-those with autism,
mental retardation, and emotional disturbances-are included
within these categories.
Each child with a disability receives special education
services in accordance with his or her Individualized Education
Program ("IEP").13 The IEP is the result of a collaborative
process between school district personnel, the parents, and"whenever appropriate"-the child."
The plan contains a
statement of the child's present academic achievement7 5 and
defines annual goals designed to meet the child's needs and
Additionally, the IEP contains a
measure his progress.7 6
statement of any modifications to the child's education program
The modifications of the
to accommodate his disability.77

7120 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). The enumerated categories
are "mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or
language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional
disturbance,... orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other
health impairments or specific learning disabilities." Id. Presumably, it is from the
necessity of matching a student with disabilities with one of the enumerated
categories that the term "classified student" has emerged in educational parlance.
72 See id. § 1401(3)(A)(ii). The child must be classified within one of the
enumerated categories of disability and "by reason thereof, need[] special education
and related services." Id.
" See id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
74 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B). The "IEP Team" is comprised of the child's parents, a
general education teacher, a special education teacher, a representative of the local
education agency, individuals with special expertise regarding the child, and the
child him or herself. Id.
15 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I).
76 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II).
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including
children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are
educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular
educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
" See id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV)-(VI).
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program include, among other things, any time spent outside of
the regular education program and all related services provided
to the student.78
The IEP Team must consider that, where possible, each child
with special needs should be educated in a setting with children
who are not disabled.7 9 This comports with current educational
theory that suggests that the child will benefit not only
cognitively but will develop more suitable social relationships
with peers.8 0
Where appropriate, students attend regular
classes-that is, they are "mainstreamed"--and receive ancillary
services from special education teachers either in the regular
class setting or for a period of time each day outside of the
regular classroom. 1
The child's plan for aversive therapies would necessarily
appear on the IEP as a related service, 2 and its necessity would
be determined initially by the IEP Team. The IEP is subject to
review on an annual basis at minimum, but more frequently as
appropriate. 3 Unless the parent provides otherwise, the IEP

78 These

modifications might include such items as special transportation
services, speech and language therapy, physical therapy, occupation therapy, and
other supportive services.
79 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
"0See Elizabeth Palley, Challenges of Rights-Based Law: Implementing the
Least Restrictive Environment Mandate, 16 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 229, 230

(2006).
"I Adherence to the requirement that children be placed in the so-called "least
restrictive environment" has led many school districts to devise plans where
students receive special services in their home district. N.Y. STATE
EDUC. DEP'T, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT FOR 2005-06, at 42 (2007),
http://www.vesid.nysed.gov/specialed/spp/apr2007/juneO7.pdf. Ninety-three percent
of students in New York receive special education services concurrently with time
spent in a general education classroom. See id. The majority of New York's special
education students are removed from their general education classes for services less
than twenty-one percent of total school time per day. See id. These services include,
among others, speech and language therapy, reading support, physical therapy,
occupational therapy, and psychological services. For many students with severe
disabilities, however, this arrangement is simply not feasible. Some children, for
instance, must receive educational services in a special school, in a residential school
setting, or in their homes. In New York State only 6.9% of the nearly 390,000
students with disabilities were placed in settings outside of their home district. Id.
82 For a discussion of the classification of aversive therapies as a related
service
under 20 U.S.C. § 1401, see infra Part III.A.
s 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i).
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Team would reconvene to make any amendments to the child's
education plan. 4
The local educational agency 5 is responsible for providing
each child classified with a disability with services that meet the
standard of a "free appropriate public education. ' 6 The Supreme
Court has held that an appropriate education "is provided when
Of great
personalized educational services are provided."8 7
importance is that the Court has opined that the requirement of
an "appropriate education" under the IDEA does not rise to the
level of the best possible education for the child. 8 It determined
that Congress used the term "appropriate" to recognize that
there are settings that are "not suitable environments for the
participation of some handicapped children 8 9 and that "it is clear
that ['appropriate' does] not mean a potential-maximizing
education.""

It is to be expected that parents and schools would disagree
as to what is "appropriate" for a child. Congress contemplated
that such disputes would arise, and the plain text of the IDEA
sets out an administrative framework to resolve them.9 ' Parents
84 Id.
§ 1414(d)(3)(D), (F). A parent may, for example, provide that minor
changes be made to the IEP without reconvening the IEP Team. The parent would
receive the amended IEP in writing if he or she so requested. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(F).
Such a minor revision could be a change that increases a student's speech services
-from once per week to twice per week.
s5A local educational agency is "a public board of education or other public
authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or
direction of... public elementary schools or secondary schools in a city,... school
district, or other political subdivision of a State." Id. § 1401(19)(A).
I Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A). The lay perception of the word "child" in the statute is
refuted by its text. Persons with disabilities aged three to twenty-one are entitled to
a free appropriate public education, including those who have been suspended or
expelled from their school. Id. But cf id. § 1412(a)(1)(B) (allowing certain limitations
for incarcerated persons aged eighteen to twenty-one and individuals aged three to
five and eighteen to twenty-one where application of the IDEA would be inconsistent
with state law).
87 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 197 (1982).
88 See id. at 197 n.21; see also Loren F. ex rel. Fisher v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys.,
349 F.3d 1309, 1312 n.1 (11th Cir. 2003); Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811
F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987); Springdale Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 693 F.2d 41,
43 (8th Cir. 1982); cf. Barnett ex rel. Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d
146, 154 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that a local educational agency must balance the
special needs of the child with a disability with the economic needs of the agency).
" Rowley, 458 U.S. at 197 n.21.
9 Id.
91 The "plain text" of the United States Code may be daunting for a parent
who-as is often the case-attends these administrative hearings unrepresented by
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are entitled to certain procedural safeguards under the IDEA if
they feel that the child is not receiving a free appropriate public
education.92 Upon receipt of a complaint from the parents in
respect to action taken or not taken,93 the local education agency
must respond with particularity to the subject matter of the
complaint. 9 If both parties agree, they may attend mediation at
the cost of the state95 and, if they resolve the situation, execute a
binding document detailing the resolution. 96 If the parties are
unable to use the mediation process successfully, each retains its
right to a due process hearing without delay. 97
Mediation, though encouraged, is not mandatory, and a
party who does not wish to participate may demand to move
directly to a due process hearing. 9 Prior to this hearing, the
parents and local education agency-along with the IEP Teammeet for the purpose of resolving the dispute.9 9 This meeting,
unlike the mediation process, is mandatory. 10 0 If at this time, the
parents and the local education agency resolve the dispute, they
will execute a legally binding agreement.0 1
However, if the
agency has not resolved the dispute to the satisfaction of the

counsel. Where aversives are in issue, the difficulty in navigating the IDEA's
framework is highly detrimental to the child, implicating the need for reform in this
limited context.
92 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (Supp. IV 2004). The local education agency
must
make a copy of the procedural safeguards available to the parents at once per year.
Id. § 1415(d)(1)(A). Additionally, local education agencies that maintain websites
may make a copy of the procedural safeguards available via the Internet. Id.
§ 1415(d)(1)(B).
" See id. § 1415(b)(6).
94 See id. § 1415(c)(2)(B)(i)(I). This response is not necessary where the agency
has previously sent written notice to the parents regarding the subject matter of
their complaint. Id.
95 Id. § 1415(e)(2)(D).
96 Id. § 1415(e)(2)(F).
9'Id. § 1415(e)(2)(A)(ii). The use of mediation is greatly encouraged by the
IDEA. Procedures must be in place by the state or local education agency to allow
parents to meet with disinterested parties to "encourage the use, and explain the
benefits, of the mediation process." Id. § 1415(e)(2)(B)(ii). If parties ultimately agree
to attend a mediation session, their discussions are kept confidential and may not be
used as evidence in subsequent due process hearings or in civil actions. Id.
§ 1415(e)(2)(G).
98 Id. § 1415(f)(1)(A).
9 Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i).
100Id.

101Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii). Either party may void the settlement agreement
within three business days. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iv).
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will

commence. 102
The "due process" safeguards afforded to the parties include
the right to be accompanied by counsel and by others who are
knowledgeable of education of students with disabilities,1 0 3 the4
10
right to access of the student's evaluations through discovery,
The due
and the right to call and cross-examine witnesses.0
process hearing is presided over by an impartial hearing officer
who has knowledge of the applicable law 0 6 and the applicable
procedural standards." 7 At the close of the hearing, the officer
renders a binding decision as to "whether the child received a
free appropriate public education."0 8
Any party may appeal the decision of the impartial hearing
Where the hearing was conducted by the local
officer. 109
education agency, the party must appeal to the state education
When all administrative avenues have been
agency. 1 0
exhausted, "any party aggrieved" may file suit in a district court
of the United States or in a state court of competent
jurisdiction."' The federal courts have consistently recognized
that a claim may not be brought under the IDEA until the entire
The courts,
administrative process has been exhausted." 2
however, have restrained their review of the administrative

Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii).
Id. § 1415(h)(1).
1o4 Id. § 1415(ft(2)(A).
105 Id. § 1415(h)(2).
106 See id. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i)(II)-(ii).
107 Id. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(iii).
108 Id. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). The hearing officer must decide whether the child
received a free appropriate public education on substantive grounds with few
exceptions. Id. She may only determine that a child did not receive a free
appropriate public education based on matters alleging procedural violations in
limited circumstances. See id. § 1415(f)(1)(E)(i)-(ii).
1o Id. § 1415(g)(1).
110 See id.; id. § 1415(g)(2).
" Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
112 See, e.g., Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 526 (2007); Bell
v. Anderson Cmty. Sch., No. 1:07-cv-00936-JDT-WTL, 2007 WL 2265067, at *8 (S.D.
Ind. Aug. 6, 2007); cf. Mosely v. Bd. of Educ., 434 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 2006)
102
103

(holding that a failure to exhaust under the IDEA is an affirmative defense and that

the plaintiff need not do so to make clear its exhaustion in its pleading).
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hearings by assigning significant weight to the finding of the
113
impartial hearing officer below.
B.

Clarifying the Rights Afforded by the IDEA: Winkelman

A fundamental purpose of the IDEA is to "ensure that the
rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children
are protected."" 4 At the forefront of the enumerated rights in the
IDEA is the right to a free appropriate public education with the
goal of preparing students with disabilities "for further
education, employment, and independent living."11
The combination of the rights granted by the IDEA and the
provision that "any party aggrieved" may bring a civil action has
led to considerable disagreement among the courts as to whose
rights are being violated and who may bring an action to enforce
them. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Winkelman v.
Parma City School District,1 6 the circuit courts were split as to
whether the rights under the IDEA inhered exclusively in the
child with disabilities or in both the child and his or her
parents. 17 The question turned on whether the parents' rights
under the IDEA were merely procedural or whether they were
also afforded substantive rights.'
In Winkelman, the Court
resolved the circuit split in the context of whether a parent could
113See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204-08 (1982) (detailing
legislative history of IDEA's administrative process in relation to district court
review). This current deferential standard could allow aversive therapies to be
implemented with too little judicial supervision. See infra Part III.B.
114 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B).
5 Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
116

550 U.S. 516.

117

See id. at 521-22 (discussing various circuits' rulings on whether only the

child or both the parents and the child have the right to a free appropriate public
education in the context of the parent filing suit pro se).
118 Compare Cavanaugh ex rel. Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist.,
409 F.3d
753, 757 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the IDEA confers on parents procedural rights,
which "exist only to ensure that the child's substantive right to a [free appropriate
public education] is protected and do not confer on the parents a vicarious,
substantive right to a [free appropriate public education]"), overruled by Winkelman,
550 U.S. 516, and Collinsgru ex rel. Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d
225, 236 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that Congress did not intend to create joint rights in
parents and children within the context of the IDEA), overruled by Winkelman, 550
U.S. 516, and Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)
(per curiam) (holding that a parent is entitled to his own action under IDEA where
procedural rights were violated), with Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg'l Sch. Dist., 346
F.3d 247, 253 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that parents are "parties aggrieved" for both
substantive and procedural claims under the IDEA).
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proceed pro se in federal court asserting rights under the
IDEA, 119 holding that the IDEA conveys rights to parents as well
as to their children.12 ° The Court rejected the contention that
parents enjoyed only procedural rights and stated that the "IDEA
does not differentiate ... between the rights accorded to children
and the rights accorded to parents. 121 Parents, therefore, may be
"part[ies] aggrieved" under the provision of the IDEA that allows
122
them to bring a civil action.
The breadth of the Court's holding with respect to the rights
afforded parents was criticized in Justice Scalia's dissent.1 23 In
fact, he described as a "startling proposition" the Court's
determination that the IDEA does not differentiate between the
rights afforded to children and the rights afforded to their
parents .124 He argued that "[p]arents and children are distinct
legal entities under the IDEA." 25 Justice Scalia pointed to the
plain text of the IDEA stating that it makes clear that the
parents of a child do not have a right to the education itself and
that the free appropriate public education "obviously inheres in
the child. 1' 26 He sharply criticized the Court for its failure to
properly apply the language "party aggrieved" 27 and pointed out
that-contrary to the Court's contention-a scheme in which the
parents and their children had independent rights would not
119

Winkelman,

550

U.S. at 522. In Winkelman, parents brought suit under the

IDEA alleging that the school district failed to provide a free appropriate public
education. Id. at 520. The parents brought action both in the name of their child and
in their own name. Id. at 520-21. The Court considered whether the parents,
proceeding pro se, could assert their own rights under the IDEA or, alternatively,
whether the parents could represent their child's interests pro se. Id. at 520. Finding
that the parents enjoyed rights under the IDEA, the Court did not need to address
the question of whether the parents could represent their child pro se. Id. at 535.
121

Id. at 529.

121 Id. at 531.
122 See id. at 526.
123 See id. at 535-36

(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and

dissenting in part, joined by Thomas, J.). Justice Thomas joined with Justice Scalia,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 535.
124 Id. at 540. He further notes that if that proposition "were so, the Court could
have spared us its painful effort to craft a distinctive parental right out of scattered
procedural provisions." Id.
125 Id.
at 541 (internal citations omitted). Justice Scalia pointed out that even
the petitioners' amici agreed that Congress' intent was that parents and children
should have independent rights under the IDEA. See id.
126 Id. at 538.
12 Id. at 542 ("Congress has used the phrase 'party aggrieved,' and it is this
Court's job to apply that language, not to run from it.").
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prove difficult to administer and had, in fact, been in place in a
majority of jurisdictions prior to this opinion. 12 8
The Court in Winkelman did not destroy the rights of the
child in its determination that her parents have rights under the
IDEA. However, its conclusion that the rights of the child and
the parent are difficult to disentangle 1 29 does not address the
possibility that children may have interests adverse to their
parents in certain circumstances. Certainly, the Court's muddy
model does not foreclose the argument. While parents and
children may have the same right to bring a cause of action
alleging a violation of a right contained in the same provision of
the IDEA, their interests in that right may nevertheless be
adverse to each other. The plain text of the IDEA seems to
contemplate that parents and children may have disagreements
as to the child's educational plan. It provides that "whenever
appropriate" the child should sit as a member of his or her IEP
Team, 3 ° the body that will analyze the child's educational
progress and set goals for the upcoming year.13 ' If Congress had
contemplated that the parents' and the child's interest would
always be identical, there would be no reason to have the child
collaborate as a member of the IEP Team.
C.

Conflicts in Interests of Parentsand Their Children
There are instances in the law where the courts have
recognized that a child has a separate, compelling interest in the
outcome of litigation that is adverse to her parents' interest. The
Supreme Court has long recognized that parents have an interest
in the rearing of their children. 132 It has stated that children are
protected "from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors.
It is also a long held maxim that parents enjoy a liberty to direct
3
the upbringing and the education of their children. 1

12 Id. at 541-42.

See id. 531-32 (majority opinion).
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
131 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
132 Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 542 ("It is not a novel proposition to say that parents
have a recognized legal interest in the education and upbringing of their child.").
13 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979).
1' See Pierce v.Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35.
129
130
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The Court, however, has also recognized that, in some
instances, a child can exercise rights superior to those of her
parents. Specifically, there are situations in which the rights
implicated by a minor's decision are so "grave and indelible" that
they warrant special consideration. 35 In respect to abortion, for
example, the Court has said that "the unique nature and
consequences of the ...decision make it inappropriate 'to give a
an absolute'" power in the decision-making
third party
process. 136 It has recognized that the minor should be able to
show either that she is mature enough to make an informed
decision or, even if she is not, that the decision would be in her
best interest. 13 Employing similar logic, courts have recognized
that minors may be able to assert superior adverse rights in
In Polovchak v. Meese, 3 9 the Seventh
immigration cases. 38
Circuit stated that it was the "finality of the decision and its
grave and potentially irreversible consequences ... that [made
the] case analogous to" the analysis in Baird.4 °
In most cases, the use of-or, in some cases, the denial ofaversive therapies implicates such "grave and indelible"
consequences. Proponents argue that without the therapies, the
child would fail to receive potentially life-saving medical or
Opponents point to the possible longpsychological treatment.'
term psychological damage suffered by the child, the deprivation
of the child's fundamental liberties, and the risk of serious
physical injury or even death.4 4 Here, however, the child is
unlikely to be able to assert her own rights in administrative or
court appearances due to either her age or due to the severity of
her disability. It is therefore appropriate, if not necessary, for
the IDEA to be amended to ensure that the child's rights are
properly protected.
' See Baird, 443 U.S. at 642-43. In Baird, the Court noted that a pregnant
minor was facing a potentially severe detriment that was not mitigated by her
minority. Id. at 642.
136Id. at 643 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
137 Id. at 643-44.
138See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 737 n.10 (7th Cir. 1985).
139774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985).
140 Id. at 737 n.10. In that case, a seventeen-year-old immigrant was able to

remain in the United States though his parents wanted him to return to the
U.S.S.R. Id. at 738.
141See supra Part I.
142See supra Part I.
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III. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ENSURING THAT CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS ARE AFFORDED DUE WEIGHT IN CASES
INVOLVING AVERSIVES.

The IDEA should be amended to create a more permanent
framework and to ensure uniform protection for children in need
of or already receiving certain aversive therapies throughout the

United States.
It is critical that it provide for more procedural
safeguards in cases where certain aversive therapies are
involved. This includes immediate judicial supervision on the
limited question of whether the most severe aversive therapies
are appropriate for the individual child. Moreover, it must
provide that a guardian ad litem be appointed for the child to
ensure that his or her interests-which due to, among other
things, the possibility of restraint and restriction of movementmay be adverse to the interests of his or her parents. Finally, the
court must frame the issue of whether or not the aversive
therapies are appropriate based on an elevated standard, to wit,
the "best interests of the child" standard.
As a threshold matter, the IDEA must define aversive
therapies and provide some sort of classification system. The
entire scope of aversive therapies includes a wide spectrum of
techniques,4 not all of which require the same level of judicial
oversight. A simple classification system such as mild, moderate,
and severe could be sufficient so long as minimum standardsboth for their implementation and for training of personnel who
would employ them-were enumerated in the IDEA. 145 While a

complete taxonomy of aversive therapies is not within the scope
of this Note, it does argue that the most severe techniques143 Several states have developed rules regarding the use of aversives in the
public schools. Some allow the use of certain aversives with restrictions, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-115 (2008) (excluding all but restraint in limited emergency
situations), MINN. STAT. § 121A.67 (2008); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5122:26-163 (2008),
while some states categorically exclude their use, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C391.1(h) (2008). New York takes a rather moderate approach by excluding the use of
aversives but implementing a procedure for child-specific exceptions. BD. OF
REGENTS, THE UNIV. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., SUMMARY OF AMENDMENTS TO THE
REGULATIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION 4-6 (2006), http://www.vesid.
nysed.gov/specialed/behavioral/interventions-606.pdf. A child would, therefore, be
entitled to aversive treatment so long as a professional panel approves of the
treatment. Id. at 5-6.
144 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
145 An Ohio statute refers to a classification system that includes "minor" and
"major" aversive therapies. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5122:26-163(B)-(C).
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namely seclusion, restraint, and electrical shock-deserve
immediate judicial oversight. 146
The current process by which a child's education plan is
developed, as delineated by the IDEA, is problematic when the
most severe aversive therapies are in issue. The administrative
process provides procedural safeguards for parties to ensure that
the student receives an educational benefit. Nonetheless, these
procedures fall short of effectively protecting the child who is to
receive-or to be denied access to-aversive therapies. It is
critically important that in this limited category of cases, that the
administrative process be altered to allow prompt resolution of
any questions involving aversives. Furthermore, analysis of the
child's plan for aversive therapies should not turn on whether the
therapies are "reasonably calculated" to provide "educational
benefits"; 147 rather, the relevant standard should be raised to an
examination of whether the therapies are in the "best interest of
the child."
A.

Aversives Are Properly Within the Purview of the IDEA
Despite Their Medical Benefit

As a threshold matter, it is interesting to consider why
aversive therapies fall under the gambit of the IDEA at all. After
all, the fundamental purpose of the IDEA-"to ensure that all
children with disabilities have available to them a free
appropriate public education"4"-seems inconsistent with the
current scheme of allowing an IEP team or an impartial hearing
officer to order or to withhold severe aversive therapies for
children. In fact, if aversive therapies were not within the reach
of the IDEA, local education agencies would lose both financial

146 That is not to say that a program employing less severe aversive techniques
would not implicate some of the same concerns. While repeated exposure to
unpleasant odors may seem facially less invasive than seclusion, if a child is
especially sensitive to that treatment, the long-term negative psychological effects
may be as damaging as some of the more facially "severe" therapies.
147Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982); see also infra note 165 and
accompanying text.
148 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2000)
(emphasis added). The federal courts'
analysis of legal questions arising under the IDEA often iterates this statutory
principle. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. ex rel. Charlene F.,
526 U.S. 66, 68 (1999); Smith v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch., 916 F. Supp 872, 875 (S.D.
Ind. 1995); Curtis K. ex rel. Delores K. v. Sioux City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 895 F. Supp.
1197, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
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responsibility for and control over the administration of the
therapies.
The question of whether the benefit received from electric
shock therapy, restraint, or seclusion is "educational" rather than
"medical" is not answered with a bright-line test and depends
greatly on the treatment's intended use. It may be said, for
example, that a child who engages in repetitious self-injurious
behavior that threatens his or her health receives more of a
medical benefit than an educational benefit. 149 On the other
hand, a child who receives similar treatment to control explosive
behaviors directed at other children may be said to be receiving
more of an educational benefit than a medical benefit. 1 0 The
extent to which the treatment is medical might lead to the
erroneous conclusion that aversives do not belong within the
purview of the IDEA whatsoever.
The IDEA is not silent on the use of medical services in the
classroom.
The definition of "'free appropriate public
education'" includes both special education and "related
services " "' that are provided in conformity with the child's
IEP.152 "Medical services" are enumerated as a related service
but only "for diagnostic and evaluation purposes. 1153
The
Court has recognized though "that the phrase 'medical
services'. . . does not embrace all forms of care that might loosely
be described as 'medical' in other contexts." 5 4
In addition,
"school health services," that is, those services that ensure that
the child is able receive the free appropriate public education
contained within his IEP, are included in the scope of services
contemplated by the IDEA. 155 The Court, therefore, has upheld
as appropriate such services as medical catheterization 15 6 and

149 Obviously,
if the self-injurious behavior is such that it prevents the
child from participating in the educational process whatsoever, a successful
implementation of SIBIS will have an educational benefit.
150A child in this instance might not be able to participate in an educational
setting whatsoever without the use of the aversive.
151 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(9) (West 2008).
152 Id. § 1401(9)(D).
153 Id. § 1401(26)(A).
154 Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. ex rel. Charlene F., 526 U.S. 66,
74-75 (1999).
15 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(13) (2008).
156 See Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 895 (1984).
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one-to-one physical support for a ventilator dependent student.1" 7
As a result, it seems unlikely that simply classifying aversive
therapies as medical services will purge them from the purview
of the IDEA. To the contrary, these therapies are among those
costs that the local education agency is routinely mandated to
bear.
Whatever the precise classification of the benefit, to the
extent aversive therapies allow the child access to a free
appropriate public education, the importance of collaboration
with the local educational agency is plain. The use of the IDEA
as an administrative process, though, must be altered in this
limited context to protect the interests of the child.
The current language of the IDEA forbids personnel of the
local education agency and the state education agency to order a
child to receive prescription medications as a condition to
attending school or to receiving an evaluation or services under
the IDEA.15 Even an impartial hearing officer cannot order a
child to take his previously prescribed medications in order for
him to receive an educational benefit. Conversely, the same
hearing officer-or the child's IEP Team if all parties agreecould decide whether the child should receive aversive therapies
even without the consent of a physician.
If local education agencies and impartial hearing officers are
barred from insisting that a child follow a medical treatment
prescribed by a physician in order to have minimal access to an
education plan, they should not be given the power to insist that
a child receive aversive therapies to achieve the same end. This
is especially problematic in the case of aversives, as there is no
requirement that there be any oversight from a medical expert,
there is a possibility that the treatment will be misused for

1657 See Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 526 U.S. at 69, 79. The one-to-one
attendant would provide services such as manually ventilating the student when the
ventilator needed maintenance, suctioning his tracheotomy tube, and assisting him
with bladder catheterization. Id. at 69 n.3 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
CedarRapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 526 U.S. 66 (No. 20a)).
158 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(25)(A)
(2000) ("The State educational agency shall
prohibit State and local educational agency personnel from requiring a child to
obtain a prescription for a substance covered by the Controlled Substances Act as a
condition of attending school,... or receiving services under this chapter." (citation
omitted)).
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punitive reasons, 15 9 and the scope of judicial review is very

narrow. 160
B.

The IDEA Must Allow Direct Judicial Control of Proposed
Aversive Therapies

The ultimate determination that a child should or should not
receive aversive therapies as part of his or her education
program should not rest within the power of the IEP Team or of
the impartial hearing officer. Where the therapy sought is in the
form of seclusion, restraint, or electric shock, the courts must
have direct involvement in order to assure that aversive
therapies are properly administered to students that truly need
them. There is simply too much at stake to allow the child's
interests to go unrepresented and for judicial oversight to be
tempered by the current framework set out by the IDEA.
1.

Removal from the Administrative Process

In its current form, the IDEA grants jurisdiction to the
courts if a party brings a civil action in a federal district court or
in a state court of competent jurisdiction only after the
administrative remedies have been exhausted. 161 In such a
proceeding, the court must review the record of the
administrative proceedings below and is empowered to hear new
evidence.162
While the parties are entitled to a cause of action to enforce
their rights under the IDEA, the decision of the impartial
163
hearing officer is generally afforded considerable deference.
The Supreme Court has instructed that in civil actions brought
under the IDEA, the court must first determine whether the
1 64
"[s]tate complied with the procedures set forth in the Act."
Second, the court must determine whether the IEP developed

159 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
160 See infra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
161

See

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

See generally supra notes

66-108

and

accompanying text.
162 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C).
16 See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204-08 (1982) (detailing

legislative history of IDEA's administrative process in relation to district court
review).
16 Id. at 206.
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was "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits." 65
The impartial hearing officer's determinations are to be
afforded "due weight" by the trial court. 166 Specifically, it may
not substitute its judgment as to what is well-founded
educational policy for the officer's.1 67 The level of deference given
to the impartial hearing officer is greater when the record
indicates that his or her findings are" 'thorough and careful.' ",168
Due to the severity of the consequences of receiving or being
denied certain aversive therapies, the courts need greater
supervisory control. While the limited role that the courts play
within the administrative process enumerated by the IDEA may
be appropriate for most situations, this is not the case where
aversives are in issue. A new framework must balance the
critical implications of severe aversive therapies with the
judiciary's respect for the educational expertise of those involved
in the administrative process. A bifurcated system where the
question of aversives would be carved out of the administrative
process and decided by the courts would not only respect this
balance but would also allow for the remainder (and the bulk) of
the child's education plan to be implemented while the issue of
aversives is resolved.

16 Id. at 207. This Note argues that, in cases where aversives are in issue, this
standard be elevated to consider the "best interests of the child."
166 Id. at 206. Some courts apply a "modified de novo review" standard, making
an independent evaluation of the record below but affording due weight to
the administrative procedure below. See, e.g., S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist., 336
F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003); Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238
F.3d 755, 764 (6th Cir. 2001); Erickson v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 199 F.3d 1116,

1120 (10th Cir. 1999). At least one circuit applies a more strict standard for
overturning the findings of an impartial hearing officer. See Dale M. ex rel. Alice M.
v. Bd. of Educ., 237 F.3d 813, 815 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court
judge "must be strongly convinced that the order is erroneous").
167 See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206 (cautioning that a district court's review "is by no
means an invitation ...to substitute [its] own notions of sound educational policy
for those of the school authorities which [it] review[s]"); see also Briggs v. Bd. of
Educ., 882 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Deference is owed to state and local
agencies having expertise in the formulation of educational programs for the
handicapped.").
16 Doe v. Clark County Bd. of Educ., No. 02:03-CV-01500-LRH-RJJ, 2007 WL
2462615 at *2 (D. Nev. Aug. 28, 2007) (quoting Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141,
1145 (9th Cir. 1999)); see, e.g., Collins v. Bd. of Educ., 164 F. App'x 19, 21 (2d Cir.
2006).
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The isolated issue of whether it is appropriate for a child to
receive severe aversive therapies in the educational setting
should fall solely within the purview of the courts. The question
should be immediately removed to the court whenever the issue
of aversives becomes ripe. The issue would ripen for judicial
decision in one of two ways and, consequently, would
immediately be submitted without delay to a federal district
court or to a state court of competent jurisdiction. 6 9 One
instance where a claim would be ripe is where all parties agree
on the use of aversives. In such a case, the issue should be
submitted when the IEP Team concludes that the student should
receive aversives and seeks to add them to the child's IEP. On
the other hand, where there is a disagreement, the issue would
ripen and be submitted to the court when one party appeals on
the issue of the appropriateness of the therapy. Given the rather
small subset of the special education population for which these
therapies are considered, combined with the narrow issue to be
resolved, it is unlikely that the courts would become
overburdened by such a process.
This removal procedure would allow the court to hear
evidence presented on the issue and make a determination about
the appropriateness of the plan for aversives without being
Furthermore, the
hampered by a limited review process.
question could be resolved in a more time efficient manner,
eliminating many steps in a multi-layered administrative
appeals process. By removing the isolated question of aversive
therapies, the IEP Team could continue to develop the child's
education program and allow the child access to the educational
system in accordance with the fundamental purpose of the IDEA.
Additionally, a court order could provide for periodic review to
ensure the continuing appropriateness of the treatment.
2.

Providing a Voice for the Child

Once presented with the issue, the court must recognize that
children have rights that inhere within the IDEA 170 and that
these rights could potentially be adverse to those of their

169 This
would comport with the IDEA's current framework, allowing an
aggrieved party to bring an action "in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in
a district court of the United States." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2000).
170 See discussion supra Part I.B.
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parents.' 7 ' To that end, the court must appoint a guardian ad
litem to ensure that the child's separate interests are protected.
While common thought may suggest that parents in almost all
cases are acting with the best interests of their children in mind,
this is unfortunately not the case. Parents, sadly, "do not always
live up to society's ideals,' 72 and often "are simply too
emotionally deprived themselves to love their children
generously."' 73 In the case of aversives, however, parents may
indeed be well-intentioned but nonetheless fall short of acting in
their child's best interests. Many parents are faced with highly
emotional decisions while forming an education plan for their
child that includes aversives. This, coupled with research that
suggests that some parents later regret the use of the very
aversive therapies that they approved as part of their children's
education plan, enforces the need for a court-appointed
guardian.1 74
Federal courts may appoint guardians ad litem under Rule
17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 75 A judge may
appoint a guardian "as it deems proper for the protection of [an]
infant."'7 6 A guardian ad litem acts as a representative to the

171 See discussion
172 Catherine J.

supra Part II.B.
Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for
Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1584 (1996).
173

Id.

Amos, supra note 3; see also Smith, supra note 9 (reporting that a family
against facility that employed electrical shock therapy after giving
for her son to receive the therapy). At the time of this writing, no court
are readily available that outline any complaint or resolution of this suit.
115 FED. R. C1V. P. 17(c). "The court must appoint a guardian ad litem-or issue
another appropriate order-to protect a minor or incompetent person who is
unrepresented in an action." Id. 17(c)(2). The terms "guardian ad litem" and "next
friend" are often used interchangeably as their duties and powers as a minor's
representative are identical. Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1077 n.1 (9th Cir.
1978). "In precise legal parlance," however, "a minor plaintiff sues by a 'next friend,'
while a minor defendant defends by a 'guardian ad litem.'" Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 834 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)). Rule 17(c) was amended on December 1, 2007,
consistent with other changes made throughout the Rules as part of the 2007
amendments. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17 advisory committee's note. The amendment is
intended to be stylistic only and "part of the general restyling" of the Rules "to make
them more easily understood." Id.
176 Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958) (citing FED. R.
CIV. P. 17(c)). In Roberts, the court stated that a court should usually appoint a
guardian ad litem "as a matter of proper procedure." Id. The court noted, however,
that the court may weigh all of the circumstances and issue an order that will
protect the interests of the minor in lieu of appointing a guardian ad litem or,
See
filed suit
permission
documents
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court "to act for the minor in the cause, with authority to engage
counsel, file suit and to prosecute, control and direct the
litigation."17 7
The courts have consistently recognized the
importance of appointing a guardian ad litem when there is an
apparent conflict between the interests of the minor's general
representative and the interest of the minor herself. 178 The
decision to appoint a guardian "rests with the sound discretion of
the district court and will not be disturbed unless there has been
an abuse of its authority."'17 9
A guardian ad litem is not necessarily an attorney and his or
her role is distinguishable from that of a person acting as an
attorney. 8 0 The major distinguishing characteristic between a
guardian ad litem and an attorney appointed for the child is that
the guardian ad litem advocates for the child's best interests
irrespective of the child's wishes while an attorney zealously
promotes the child's expressed interests.'8 Where the child, due
to infancy or-as here-legal incompetence, cannot express

alternatively, determine that the interests of the minor are protected without a
guardian. Id.
177 Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74, 82 (9th Cir. 1955). A parent may not
claim, as a matter of right, to be the guardian ad litem of a minor. Id.
178 Hoffert v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1981); see
also M.S.
v. Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 176 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting inappropriateness of
appointing parents as guardians ad litem where their interests in the litigation were
in direct conflict with their daughter's interests); Geddes v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 881
F. Supp. 94, 100 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (appointing guardian ad litem where the proposed
tort settlement showed a clear conflict of interest between the children and their
mother); cf. In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 788 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding that guardian ad litem need not be appointed for future litigants),
rev'd sub nom. on other grounds Maytag Corp. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 219
F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2000); Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that appointment of guardian ad litem was not necessary when mother was
a party to the lawsuit, there was no conflict between the parties' interests, and she
"vigorously pressed her child's claims").
179 Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Ctr., Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281, 285
(1st Cir. 1982).
180 See Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1974). In Noe, the court noted that a
minor child seeking an abortion had legal interests adverse to her parents. Id.
Though she was represented by counsel, the Sixth Circuit found the district court to
be in error for not considering appointment of a guardian ad litem. Id.; see also
McCaslin ex rel. McCaslin v. Radcliff, 168 F.R.D. 249, 256 (D. Neb. 1996), affd sub
nom. McCaslin v. County of York, 141 F.3d 1169 (8th Cir. 1998). See generally Ross,
supra note 172, at 1614-17 (detailing differences between guardians ad litem and
attorneys that represent the child's interests).
181 See Ross, supra note 172, at 1615-16.
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a guardian ad
opinions that effect the outcome of the litigation,
82
litem is a more appropriate representative.
The necessity of appointing a guardian ad litem for children
who may receive severe aversive therapies is especially crucial in
light of Winkelman v. Parma City School District.' 3 While the
Court in Winkelman held that parents have enforceable rights
under the IDEA,' it did not explicitly parse these rights from
the rights of the child."8 5 In fact, the Court's analysis leaves the
rights of the child helplessly commingled with those of the

parent.186
The Supreme Court did not specifically address the question
of whether parents could proceed with their child's claim under
the IDEA pro se,"8 7 but Winkelman's holding effectively forecloses
any other conclusion. Following Winkelman, the lower courts
have allowed parents to proceed pro se to enforce their own
Some explicitly forbid the parent from
rights under the IDEA.'
pursuing their child's claim pro se;' 8 9 however, the distinction is
merely academic.' 9° If the parent is pursuing a claim that her
child is not receiving an "appropriate" education, the child's
rights will clearly be affected by the outcome of the litigation.
When the parents-well-intentioned as they may be-proceed
pro se on such a claim involving aversive therapy, the necessity
of a guardian ad litem is glaring.

182

See Zaro v. Strauss, 167 F.2d 218, 220 (5th Cir. 1948) (rejecting the view that

Rule 17(c) did not apply to an incompetent party that was "otherwise represented"
and finding error in district court's failure to appoint a guardian ad litem).
183 550 U.S. 516 (2007); see discussion supra Part II.B.
184 Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 535.
18I Id.
at 530-31.
186

Id.

187 Id. at 535.
'8' See, e.g., Grieco v. N.J. Dep't of Educ., No. 06-cv-4077(PGS), 2007 WL
1876498, at *10 (D.N.J. June 27, 2007).
188 See, e.g., L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. Broward County Sch. Bd., No. 06-61282-CIV,
2007 WL 1695333, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2007).
188See, e.g., id. (dismissing without prejudice child's claim that he was not
receiving an appropriate education but allowing a pro se mother to litigate claims
"for violations of her parental rights, including the right that her child receive a
meaningful education"); see also Alexandra R. ex rel. Burke v. Brookline Sch. Dist.,
No. 06-cv-215-SM, 2007 WL 2669717 at *1 (D.N.H. Sept. 6, 2007) ("[E]ven if [the
child's] parents cannot, strictly speaking, represent her in pursuing her IDEA claims
against the School District, they may pursue their own identical claims, in their own

right.").
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The importance of judicial oversight and child representation
has not gone unnoticed by the Judge Rotenberg Center, a
Massachusetts school that provides aversive therapies for some
of its students. 9 1 When a child is to receive electric shock
therapy as an aversive behavior control therapy at that school, a
multi-layered review process is employed. 192 After parental
consent, the education plan is peer-reviewed and then sent to an
in-house human rights committee. 193
Following in-house
approval, each student's plan is approved by a Massachusetts
probate court with the child's interests represented by his own
appointed attorney. 194 Legislatures should take notice that
schools that use aversive therapies as an educational tool have
already developed safeguards to protect the children that they
serve. While these efforts are commendable, they are isolated; an
amendment to the IDEA would grant similar, uniform protection
to all of the Nation's children who may need aversive
therapies. 9
3.

The Courts Must Consider the "Best Interests of the Child"
The relevant legal standard for a judge to consider when
severe aversive therapies are at issue should be more stringent
than "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits." 196 This standard is extremely deferential
to education agencies and IEP Teams and is appropriate in
virtually all contexts within the IDEA. The courts should defer
to the professional opinions of teachers and school personnel
where the issue presented is one of placement in a particular
educational setting. Similarly, psychologists and teachers are
likely to be in the best position to make determinations regarding
curriculum. In these typical situations, the courts deference and
application of the "reasonably calculated" standard is
appropriate.
191See supra note 9 (discussing the education program at this school and the

controversy surrounding it).
192 See

Judge Rotenberg Center, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.

judgerc.org/faqs.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
193 Id.

Id.
195In addition to providing a layer of protection to children in the initial
determination, a court could retain jurisdiction over the matter and periodically
ensure the child's program.
196 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 177 (1982).
194
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When the question before the court involves the application
for severe aversive therapies, the courts should look outside the
realm of the IDEA and related jurisprudence and instead apply
the "best interest of the child" standard, which is often used in
custody hearings.1 97 Such a test would require a court to afford
the child's interests due weight by balancing his needs against
the rights of his parents. The fundamental nature of the adverse
interests between parent and child created by the prospect of
severe aversive therapies demand that the child's interests be
afforded this level of consideration.
The very purpose of removing the issue of whether a student
may receive these therapies would be undercut if the court could
approve or deny a plan that met the low threshold of "reasonably
calculated to give the child an educational benefit." After
removal from the IDEA's administrative framework and
appointment of a guardian ad litem to advocate for the child's
rights, the court should naturally make a decision that is in the
"best interest of the child."
CONCLUSION

The IDEA's administrative process allows some children to
be denied life-saving aversive therapies while others are
subjected to the therapies without warrant. These decisions are
permitted to be made by a committee of teachers, the parents of
the child, and school officials without any input or oversight by
the courts. An error by a committee can have a dramatic, longterm impact on a child's physical and mental health.
The IDEA must be amended in order to minimize the
possibility of error and protect the well-being of these
particularly fragile children. A bifurcated process that removes
the limited question of aversives from the current administrative
process and grants it instead to the courts would add a crucial
layer of protection without complicating the remainder of the

197 See 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 931 (2008); see also Elizabeth
P. Miller, Note, Deboer v. Schmidt and Twigg v. Mays: Does the "Best Interests of the
Child" Standard Protect the Best Interests of Children?, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 497, 504
(1994). While the "best interests" standard is used in almost all jurisdictions, see AM.
JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 931, its application is not uniform, see Miller,
supra, at 509-10. Jurisdictions balance the best interests of the child against the
rights of their parents in varying degrees, id. at 504; however, "[a]ll courts agree
that the best interests of the child is a paramount consideration," id. at 519.
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child's education plan. The existing administrative process could
develop the bulk of the program while the court oversees the
aversive therapy component.
Once the question is removed to the court, the IDEA must
provide that it appoint a guardian ad litem to speak for the child.
Even the most well-intentioned parent's judgment can be clouded
by his or her sheer emotional involvement in the decision.
Additionally, the administration of aversives very often places
the parent and the child in a posture that is hostile to each other.
A guardian ad litem would speak exclusively on behalf of the
child and give the court a perspective divorced from the school
district's financial interests and the parents' understandably
tempestuous involvement in the decision.
Finally, the courts must consider the decision to administer
or withhold aversive therapies in light of the "best interest of the
child" standard.
The current standard, to wit, "reasonably
calculated to give the child educational benefits," is simply too
deferential as applied to the narrow question of aversives. The
bifurcated system and the appointment of a guardian ad litem
would be undercut by such a standard of review. The farreaching consequences of the determination of whether to include
aversive therapies demand a more thorough analysis by the
court.
The scholarly debate among educational psychologists about
the risks and benefits of aversive therapies remains contentious;
the legal system is not in any position to resolve it. What the
courts and the legislatures must do while the debate wages on, is
seal the cracks in the IDEA that many children are falling
through. By enacting these procedural safeguards, legislators
can ensure that students who need access to aversive therapies
can receive them after an informed and calculated judicial
determination.

